Misinformation and its political consequences: The case of Brexit

By Ioannis Serefas

Table of Contents

Introduction. 3

Misinformation as a political weapon. 3

The Eurosceptic background preceding the referendum… 4

Forms of misinformation during the Brexit referendum… 4

Political and institutional implications. 7

Strategies to combat misinformation. 8

Conclusions. 9

References. 11

 

Introduction

  In recent years, social media has emerged as a significant source of information and a crucial factor in the formation of public opinion. In this contemporary context, a primary challenge faced by modern democratic societies is the combatting of misinformation, defined as the deliberate propagation of false information. The 2016 referendum on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit) serves as a prime example of how misinformation can significantly influence electoral behavior and political developments (Henkel, 2021). During the election campaign, disinformation was spread extensively through automated accounts (bots), while the electorate was manipulated through the creation of echo chambers, leading to a polarized and divided electorate (Bastos et al., 2018). These measures resulted in a weakening of the public’s trust in institutions and the propagation of misinformation as a political instrument. Moreover, they led to the fragmentation of British public opinion (Greene et al., 2021).

 The present analysis aims to examine the ways in which misinformation is used as a political lever in contemporary political systems. To do so, the analysis will: record the fake news stories that were used during the Brexit referendum; examine the role of social networks in spreading such stories; consider the psychological impact on citizens; investigate the involvement of foreign powers; and evaluate the effect on the functioning and credibility of institutions. Finally, the solutions adopted by the EU to prevent similar incidents of misinformation and manipulation of public opinion in the future will be examined.

Misinformation as a political weapon

  Disinformation is defined as all forms of false, inaccurate, or misleading information that is deliberately designed, presented, or promoted for the purpose of causing public harm or generating profit (European Commission, 2018). Disinformation is distinct from fake news, a term that is more politically charged and which is often used by citizens to attack media outlets or journalists with whom they disagree (Graves & Nielsen, 2017).

The generation of disinformation is driven by either ideological or financial motivations: The publication of controversial news content can result in significant online engagement, thereby generating revenue for content producers through advertising. Additionally, such content can be strategically employed by these producers to advance specific agendas or to attack their competitors (Freelon & Wells, 2020). The consumption of fake news in Western countries has been linked to a significant decline in public trust in traditional media and government institutions (Freelon & Wells, 2020). Consequently, citizens receive more information via social media, which, in addition to being productive ground for the emergence of fake news, has tended to polarize people ideologically, thereby undermining the quality of democracy (Kubin & Sikorski, 2021).

  Misinformation is typically disseminated via bots, trolls, or false profiles, which collectively proliferate content, fostering perceptions of the predominance of specific viewpoints within society (Bentzen, 2019). According to Bentzen, the content is often not entirely false but taken out of context. In other cases, the concept is exaggerated, with the deliberate intention of targeting emotional manipulation. The capture of personal data facilitates the targeting of individuals based on their political identities, fears, and age by disinformation campaigns. The primary objective of these campaigns is the erosion of democratic institutions and societal division (Bentzen, 2019).

The Eurosceptic background preceding the referendum

  The emergence of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom was not a spontaneous occurrence in 2016. Systematic narratives of exaggerated and false news about the EU (known as “euromyths”) have long served as a tool for shaping British national identity in relation to Europe, creating the ideological and emotional foundations for Brexit (Henkel, 2021). A pivotal figure in this process was Boris Johnson, who, in his capacity as Brussels correspondent for the Daily Telegraph and leveraging his sense of humor, fabricated or exaggerated stories that created the impression that the EU was suppressing the national sovereignty of the United Kingdom (Henkel, 2021). This fostered a sense of distrust among the British towards the EU.

  In addition to Boris Johnson, classic tabloid journalism, which primarily appeals to an audience of older and less educated citizens, has been shown to create a strongly chauvinistic and anti-European climate over an extended period (Bastos & Mercea, 2017). These readers had already developed Eurosceptic tendencies prior to the referendum, which were reinforced by immigration, economic insecurity, and the rapidly changing political landscape. Therefore, the “Vote Leave” campaign targeted the anti-European sentiments of these groups by promoting traditional British values and British nationalism in opposition to Europe, thus securing their votes in the referendum (Bastos & Mercea, 2017).

Forms of misinformation during the Brexit referendum

  During the Brexit campaign, political forces in favor of the United Kingdom leaving the EU used a variety of strategies to persuade British voters to vote in favor of leaving (Fisher & Gaber, 2021). One such tactic was the employment of strategic lies; that is: intentional lies intended not to be immediately accepted as true, but rather to dominate public discourse and the election agenda by generating greater levels of noise (Fisher & Gaber, 2021). As Fisher and Gaber argue, the significant communicative advantage of strategic lies was that even their critical repetition by political opponents or fact checkers inadvertently established them in public discourse, making them seem increasingly credible. This phenomenon was termed ‘adverse legitimization’. The most prominent strategic falsehoods employed included the narrative that the EU imposes a £350 million weekly financial burden on the UK and the claim that Türkiye would join the EU immediately, resulting in a rapid influx of Turkish immigrants to the UK (Fisher & Gaber, 2021).

  During the period of the Brexit referendum, misinformation had a direct impact on the ideological background and psychology of voters (Greene et al., 2021). According to the same source, it is estimated that 44% of voters created a memory based on a story that never happened, with “Vote Leave” voters remembering false stories that slandered “Remain” voters, and vice versa. The content of these stories included issues such as institutional corruption, illegal donations, and the undermining of democracy. Voters who supported the UK leaving the European Union were more prone to the fabrication of false memories, in contrast to those who favored remaining. Furthermore, critical thinkers were found to be less likely to engage in such memory creation. It is evident that the propagation of misinformation through various media channels can collectively shape a distorted collective perception of reality (Greene et al., 2021).

  In addition, social networks played a significant role during the Brexit period (BBC News, 2018). According to the same source, the “Vote Leave” campaign spent over £2.7 million on Facebook advertisements, targeting specific social and age demographics. The advertisements addressed issues such as immigration, animal rights, and the UK’s financial contribution to the EU, frequently presenting information that was either misleading or exaggerated. The goal of this strategy was to target voters’ emotions. These advertisements were viewed a total of over 169 million times, with Boris Johnson being the only politician featured in them. The Electoral Commission ruled that the official campaign in favor of Brexit had violated electoral law by collaborating with the BeLeave team (BBC News, 2018).

  Bots played a significant role in the propagation of misinformation through social media, significantly amplifying specific hashtags and narratives (Bastos & Mercea, 2017). According to Bastos and Mercea, this caused the impression that there was universal support for Brexit, despite the reality being more complex. The majority of these pro-Brexit bots (“Brexit Botnet”) utilized limited domains of questionable quality to repost the same articles and hashtags, thereby bypassing the mainstream media. The content was rarely outright false, but was often exaggerated and emotionally charged and lacked a high degree of verifiability. The content shared via repost on the platform was characterized by an overwhelming presence of personal narratives, often accompanied by intense emotions such as fear, anger, and a strong feeling of national pride. The misinformation spread by bots did not concentrate on constructing complete ideas or narratives; rather, it focused on repetition, continuous reposting, and emotional manipulation (Bastos & Mercea, 2017).

  In relation to the spread of misinformation on Twitter, research has indicated that bots played a key role in promoting specific hashtags, such as #TakeControl and #Brexit (Gorodnichenco et al., 2021). According to the same source, users interacted with tweets that confirmed their views (forming an ‘echo chamber’), while intense ideological polarization was observed, particularly during periods of significant political developments. It was found that leave voters were more strongly associated with pessimistic rhetoric, while it was discovered that tweets with emotionally charged content (positive or negative) were significantly more likely to be reposted than neutral ones. The majority of reposts occurred between one and two hours after the initial posts, thereby demonstrating the efficacy of social networks in rapidly disseminating information. However, this phenomenon also highlights the rapid decline in interest (Gorodnichenco et al., 2021).

  Another factor that contributed to the dissemination of misinformation during the Brexit process was the intervention of external actors (Ellehenus, 2020). As stated by Ellehenus, the UK Information Security Committee (ISC) has reported that the British government did not conduct a sufficient investigation into the possibility of Russian interference in Brexit, despite indications of similar actions in previous referendums, including that in Scotland in 2014. The report observes that, in contrast to the extensive research conducted by the United States into Russian interference in the 2016 elections, the United Kingdom did not undertake a comparable investigation. While there is an absence of evidence indicating direct involvement, there is a possibility that Russia may have utilized disinformation and economic penetration through real estate investments, in conjunction with relationships with political figures, to influence public opinion in favor of Brexit. In the aftermath of the closely decided referendum, the report suggests the possibility that Russian interference may have influenced the outcome (Ellehenus, 2020).

At the same time, the Treasury Select Committee accused both the Leave and Remain campaigns of using misleading figures and unfounded assumptions (BBC News, 2016). According to the same source, the Vote Leave campaign claimed that the UK would save £350 million per week if it left the EU. The Commission has characterized this claim as “deeply problematic” due to its failure to consider the rebate and other payments returned to the UK. In contrast, the Remain campaign asserted that a withdrawal would result in a £3,400 loss for every family unit. The Commission considered this to be an inaccurate and potentially misleading representation of the data to voters, as this amount refers to GDP per household and not to disposable income. The Commission concluded that neither side had provided the public with sufficient information, resulting in confusion and a deterioration in public political debate (BBC News, 2016).

Political and institutional implications

  In the 2016 referendum, Brexit prevailed with 51.89% of the vote, resulting in immediate consequences for the political, party, institutional, and social landscape of the United Kingdom (Gamble, 2018). According to Gamble, Brexit has had the effect of weakening Britain’s international power, increasing its reliance on the US, and reinforcing the secessionist tendencies of both Scotland and Northern Ireland. These are the regions where the “Remain” vote prevailed. This outcome has served to undermine the unity of the United Kingdom. Moreover, Brexit caused a leadership crisis and deep divisions within the Conservative and Labor parties, with populist tendencies gaining strength and party alliances shifting. This highlighted Britain’s internal divide between parliamentary and popular sovereignty. In economic terms, while a sudden economic collapse may have been prevented, the long-term financial implications of Brexit are estimated to amount to £400 billion by 2030. The regions that voted in favor of exiting the EU are projected to be the most severely affected (Gamble, 2018).

  The Brexit process has had a profound effect on the country’s political culture (Hutton, 2021). According to Hutton, a considerable number of prominent British politicians continue to deliberately disseminate falsehoods in public discourse, as evidenced by the Brexit referendum, which demonstrated the efficacy of such tactics. Politicians who disseminate falsehoods appear to face little to no sanctions, instead enjoying public exposure and influence. This phenomenon of impunity has been identified as a contributing factor to the undermining of institutional integrity and transparency. (Williams, 2024) The Brexit campaign has been characterized by a dissemination of misleading information. As result, since 2016, British political culture has been marked by a prevalence of misinformation, a predilection for sensationalist news, and an unwillingness to take responsibility. As Hutton (2021) argues, public trust in government and institutions has reached an unprecedented low, thus increasing the influence of far-right groups.

  The findings of the British Parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) Committee have concluded that the nation has been facing a “democratic crisis” since 2016, primarily because of the prevalence of targeted misinformation disseminated via social networks (BBC News, 2018). According to the same source, the committee accused Facebook of undermining its efforts to gather information by providing witnesses who were unable or unwilling to provide detailed answers. The committee proposed a series of measures to curb misinformation, including the creation of a registry and digital signatures on political advertisements, as well as the imposition of a tax on technology companies, with the revenue being used to strengthen regulatory authorities and promote digital education in schools (BBC News, 2018).

  Despite the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, bots continue to be a primary vehicle for the dissemination of misinformation (Spring, 2024). According to Spring, during the 2024 election campaign, suspicious social media accounts were identified, despite being inactive for an extended period and containing no photos, repeatedly posted phrases such as “Vote Reform UK”. It has been posited that some of these accounts may not have been UK-based, since they used phrases that are unusual for native English speakers, such as “make an article” instead of “write an article.” These accounts created the illusion of widespread support for Reform UK, while the party itself denied any involvement with them (Spring, 2024).

Strategies to combat misinformation

  In its report, the European Commission (2018) proposes a series of measures to combat misinformation. Firstly, platforms are required to disclose information regarding the algorithms employed to promote content, with a view to explaining how misinformation disseminates. In addition, measures to verify user identity are recommended to limit the activity of bots. Social networks should adhere to a code of conduct with clear commitments and mechanisms for monitoring suspicious accounts and should regularly publish reports on the measures they are taking to combat misinformation. An additional measure is cooperation between EU Member States and other international organizations to exchange information and tactics, with the aim of jointly developing innovative strategies to limit misinformation (Smith, 2022). Finally, the European Commission (2018) proposes educational measures to assist citizens in developing critical thinking skills in relation to false information. These measures include the introduction of a course on social media education into school curricula and the organization of information campaigns to raise citizens’ awareness of misinformation and its effects.

Conclusions

  The Brexit case demonstrated that targeted misinformation has the potential to manipulate political processes and undermine institutional functioning, even in the most developed democracies. In the case of the United Kingdom, the decision to leave the European Union was founded on misinformation long before 2016. The spread of misinformation about the EU, known as ‘euromyths’, has been identified as a key factor in the escalation of intense nationalist and anti-European sentiments among the British public. This phenomenon has been particularly notable during the period prior to the referendum.

   In the days leading up to the referendum, supporters of Brexit utilized a series of misinformation tactics, including strategic falsehoods and online propaganda via bots, to construct their anti-European narrative. Misinformation, including the assertion that the EU imposes an economic burden upon the United Kingdom, has become entrenched in public discourse, contributing to shaping public perceptions through misinformation. A significant proportion of the British population, primarily those who voted in favor of Brexit, have formed a memory based on false information, thereby distorting their perception of reality. The proliferation of false information on social networks, amplified by bots and echo chambers, deepened ideological divisions among voters. Also, there were reports of foreign powers, such as Russia, being involved in a misinformation campaign in favor of Brexit. The British government failed to conduct a thorough investigation into these claims.

  The consequences of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, in combination with the misinformation which had been cultivated in the period leading up to the referendum, were disastrous for the country. The consequences of Brexit for Britain included diplomatic isolation, economic weakness, and a political crisis. Meanwhile, the lack of accountability for politicians spreading disinformation has entrenched its role in public discourse. In consequence, there has been an increase in the popularity of far-right and populist parties. The dissemination of false information about British political developments on social media by bots continues, and these accounts appear to have played a pivotal role in the propaganda campaign of the far-right Reform UK party in the 2024 elections.

  To function effectively without being undermined by external interference and interests, both democracies and institutions must develop strategies to combat misinformation. Such strategies may include the execution of information campaigns to educate citizens about misinformation, the promotion of greater accountability and transparency within social networks, the verification of users to limit the activity of bots, and the cooperation across national borders to facilitate the exchange of information and establish a unified approach to combatting misinformation. The rapid development of technology and new methods of producing fake news requires innovative strategies and global cooperation, especially considering the consequences that the political world has already experienced. Brexit exposed how democracies remain vulnerable to coordinated disinformation. Future policies must balance freedom of expression with safeguards against manipulation, or such crises will repeat.

References

Bastos, M. T., & Mercea, D. (2017). The Brexit Botnet and User-Generated Hyperpartisan News. Social Science Computer Review, 37(1), 38-54.   Available at:       https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439317734157     

Bastos, M., Mercea, D., & Baronchelli, A. (2018). The geographic embedding of online echo chambers: Evidence from the Brexit campaign. PloS one, 13(11), e0206841. Available at: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0206841&type=printable   

BBC News. (2016). EU referendum campaigns ‘misleading voters’. Available at:    https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36397732   

BBC News. (2018).  Vote Leave’s targeted Brexit ads released by Facebook. Available at:  https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-44966969     

BBC News. (2018). Fake news a democratic crisis for UK, MPs warn. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44967650   

Bentzen, N. (2019). Online disinformation and the EU’s response. European Parliamentary Research Service, February. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2018/620230/EPRS_ATA(2018)620230_EN.pdf   

Ellehenus, R. (2020). Did Russia Influence Brexit? Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Available at: https://www.csis.org/blogs/brexit-bits-bobs-and-blogs/did-russia-influence-brexit  

European Commission. (2018). A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation: Report of the independent High Level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation. Publications Office of the European Union. Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/6ef4df8b-4cea-11e8-be1d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en    

Freelon, D., & Wells, C. (2020). Disinformation as political communication. Political communication, 37(2), 145-156. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10584609.2020.1723755#abstract   

Gaber, I., & Fisher, C. (2021). “Strategic Lying”: The Case of Brexit and the 2019 U.K. Election. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 27(2), 460-477. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161221994100    

Gamble, A. (2018). Taking back control: the political implications of Brexit. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(8), 1215–1232. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2018.1467952#abstract   

Gorodnichenko, Y., Pham, T., & Talavera, O. (2021). Social media, sentiment and public opinions: Evidence from# Brexit and# USElection. European Economic Review, 136, 103772. Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292121001252?ref=pdf_download&fr=RR-2&rr=93fff0ee7d4b6f49   

Greene, C. M., Nash, R. A., & Murphy, G. (2021). Misremembering Brexit: Partisan bias and individual predictors of false memories for fake news stories among Brexit voters. Memory, 29(5), 587-604. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/09658211.2021.1923754?needAccess=true   

Henkel, I. (2021). Destructive storytelling: Disinformation and the Eurosceptic myth that shaped Brexit. Springer Nature. Available at: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-69503-3

Hutton, W. (2021). The case for Brexit was built on lies. Five years later, deceit is routine in our politics. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jun/27/case-for-brexit-built-on-lies-five-years-later-deceit-is-routine-in-our-politics   

Kubin, E., & von Sikorski, C. (2021). The role of (social) media in political polarization: a systematic review. Annals of the International Communication Association, 45(3), 188–206. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2021.1976070   

Nielsen, R., & Graves, L. (2017). ” News you don’t believe”: Audience perspectives on fake news. Reuters Institute for the Study of Jounalism. Available at: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:6eff4d14-bc72-404d-b78a-4c2573459ab8/files/snp193c257   

Spring, M. (2024). Bot or not: Are fake accounts swaying voters towards Reform UK? BBC News. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1335nj316lo   

Williams, Z. (2024). Why do Tories keep repeating their £2,000 tax smear? Because Brexit convinced them that lying works. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/jun/10/tories-keep-repeating-their-2000-tax-smear-because-brexit-convinced-them-that-lying-works

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top